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Analytical Essay 
Realism under Hegemony: Theorizing the 
Rise of Brazil 
Kurt Weyland 
Abstract: What light can international relations theory shed on how 
developing countries such as Brazil have achieved regional leadership 
and international influence? This comprehensive examination of Brazili-
an foreign policy over the last few decades argues that Realism provides 
a better account of Brazil’s strategy than Liberalism and Constructivism. 
Despite changes of government and regime, Brasília has persistently 
pursued relative political gain, especially international influence. Howev-
er, because this rising country has faced an established hegemon in the 
form of the United States, it has not been able to employ conventionally 
Realist instruments and tactics. Its subordinate position in the current 
power constellation has forced Brazil to forego political or military con-
frontation and instead use economic cooperation, both with the 
hegemon and its weaker neighbors. Through this collaboration, Brazil 
hopes to derive disproportionate benefits that will enhance its relative 
power. By elucidating these complex calculations, the present essay ex-
plains the Realist strategy that ambitious nations such as Brazil have 
pursued and helps design a version of Realism that captures recent pow-
er dynamics in the international system. 
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Keywords: Brazil, foreign policy, international relations 
Kurt Weyland is Professor of Government and Mike Hogg Professor in 
Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. Over the years, he has 
conducted research on democratization, neoliberalism, populism, and 
social policy in Latin America and has recently broadened his view to 
study the diffusion of democracy and authoritarianism in Europe and 
Latin America. His current book project analyzes the wave of reactionary 
rule during the interwar years and the rash of military coups in Latin 
America during the 1960s and 1970s. Professor Weyland is an associate 
editor of JPLA. 
E-mail: <kweyland@austin.utexas.edu> 
  144 Kurt Weyland 
 
Introduction 
The study of international relations (IR) among developing countries has 
long suffered from a deficit in theory. The main IR paradigms have con-
centrated on First-World nations, especially great powers. These influen-
tial players command the greatest capacity and latitude for action, partic-
ularly in the security arena, which has traditionally attracted the most 
attention. After all, war and peace are crucial for states’ integrity and 
sheer survival, and great powers have determined the outcomes of most 
wars, shaping weaker countries’ fate as well. As far back as 2500 years 
ago, Thucydides, Realism’s classical forerunner, focused on Athens and 
Sparta, not Melos, the target of Athenian wrath. 
Like Melos in antiquity, developing countries have largely been 
viewed as the pawns of great power rivalry or victims of First-World 
oppression and exploitation (Buzan 1998: 214–217). The only IR ap-
proach conceived in the global South reinforced this tendency of ques-
tioning developing countries’ capacity for agency. Dependency theory 
depicted the former colonies as objects of Northern pressures – domi-
nated and constrained, they looked helpless. Even the few nations that 
did achieve some development remained dependent and unable to ad-
vance to any great extent (Evans 1979). 
However, dependency theory was criticized heavily because this 
bleak picture did not conform to the developmental achievements of 
increasing numbers of Asian and Latin American countries. The success 
of East Asia’s “tigers” and the rise of regional great powers like Brazil 
and India, not to mention China, have been especially striking. Develop-
ing countries have done much better than expected by the theorists of 
dependency and even by “dependent development” (early acknowledg-
ment in Evans 1986). Nations in the global South do have considerable 
agency; their states can engage in active “dependency management” 
(Gereffi 1994) and advance in the global system, despite First-World 
predominance. Brazil, for instance, created a sophisticated computer 
industry (Evans 1986) and started to export airplanes to the United 
States. 
Emerging countries’ success not only casts doubt on dependency 
theory, but also calls for a broader re-thinking. Which theory can best 
account for these nations’ advances, and how can this approach be ex-
tended beyond the global Northwest to capture the special conditions 
facing developing countries and elucidate their strategies and tactics for 
moving up in the world? Because established frameworks focus on great 
powers (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), their standard versions do not 
directly illuminate the most striking change in the contemporary world; 




that is, the emergence of new leaders in several regions. This transfor-
mation of power constellations is under way, even in Latin America, 
where the only current superpower commands predominance (Lake 
2009; Ikenberry 2011: 22–27, 55–61, 191–194, 207–216, 296–299; Don-
nelly 2006; Hurrell 2007: chap. 11). In this region, Brazil has ever more 
firmly claimed regional leadership (Schirm 2005; Burges 2009) and as-
sumed an increasingly influential global role. Both goals are exemplified 
by Brazil’s quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, 
which would turn the lusophone giant into the institutional spokesper-
son for South America. 
How can the emergence of new powers be theorized? What goals 
drive the efforts of ambitious nations to rise, and how do they pursue 
these goals? The present essay examines Brazil’s rise with a dual purpose. 
First, by drawing on the burgeoning scholarship on Brazil’s international 
relations (Amorim 2014; Burges 2008, 2009; Cason and Power 2009; 
Daudelin and Burges 2011; Hirst 2005; Hurrell 2007; Malamud 2011; 
Saraiva 2010, 2014; Schirm 2005; Schneider 1976; Selcher 1978; Smith 
2010; Soares de Lima 2010; Teixeira 2011; Trinkunas 2014; Vigevani and 
Cepaluni 2009; Zirker 1994), it offers a comprehensive theoretical inter-
pretation of the foreign policy trajectory of an important emerging power. 
Second, the Brazilian case suggests broader insights about the nec-
essary adaptation of extant theoretical paradigms. As the essay argues, 
Brazil has followed a Realist approach, pursuing primarily relative politi-
cal gains, namely national power and international influence (Schirm 
2005). However, American hegemony has imposed crucial constraints on 
this rising power. Given its disadvantageous current position in the in-
ternational power constellation, Brazil has systematically applied instru-
ments and tactics that are different to those of earlier aspirants to inter-
national leadership (cf. Gilpin 1981). The global distribution of power, 
Realism’s master variable, has forced Brazil to pursue its typically Realist 
goals in different ways than established great powers did during their 
rise. Realism itself accounts for this difference by highlighting the subor-
dinate starting place of emerging powers. By deriving insights from Bra-
zil’s ascendance, the essay helps to broaden Realism beyond its focus on 
traditional great powers. 
This Realist interpretation, which emphasizes the drive for relative 
political gains, is more persuasive than Liberal and Constructivist argu-
ments that focus on the quest for absolute economic gains or commit-
ment to globally recognized norms. Brazil’s determination to augment its 
national power certainly requires economic cooperation to boost its 
development and thereby strengthen its resource base for projecting 
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international influence. However, in contrast to Liberalism, this econom-
ic collaboration plays second fiddle to fundamental political goals, serv-
ing as mere instruments. The primacy of politics became clear in Brazil’s 
unwillingness to form a Free-Trade Area of the Americas. This pet pro-
ject of economic Liberalism promised substantial economic gains 
through increased trade and deepening specialization. For Brasília, how-
ever, Liberal integration threatened to cement American superiority and 
freeze the lusophone colossus into a subordinate political position. To 
reinforce its chances of rising in the international pecking order and 
eventually rivaling the US, Brazil forewent absolute economic gain. The 
hope for relative political advancement won out, as Realism predicts. 
Constructivism would highlight that Brazil is committed to interna-
tional norms such as peaceful conflict resolution and therefore forgoes 
the tactic traditionally associated with Realism, such as aggressive pres-
sure and military campaigns. However, this adherence to international 
principles is notoriously selective. For instance, Brasília defends democ-
racy in Paraguay, but not in Peru and Venezuela; these inconsistencies 
seem to arise from power–political calculations (Burges and Daudelin 
2007: 115–129). Opportunistic self-interest overrides value commit-
ments. Moreover, the global distribution of power – not an international 
norm – best explains why Brazil avoids military pressures: US predomi-
nance in the Americas precludes offensive actions, which would under-
mine Brazil’s chances of future advancement. Brazil’s international be-
havior is not governed by inherent value commitments, but by interest 
calculations designed to foster Brazil’s own great power ambitions. 
Thus, Realism’s master variable, the international power constella-
tion, provides a better explanation for Brazil’s foreign policy strategy 
than Liberalism or Constructivism (careful statistical corroboration in 
Amorim 2014: 160–164, 169–171, 176). Above all, Brazil’s tactical differ-
ences compared to earlier great powers can be accounted for by the 
country’s disadvantageous starting position in the quest for international 
influence . What look like elements of Liberalism and Constructivism are 
mere instruments for Brazil’s Realist strategy. 
Moreover, Realism more persuasively explains the amazing continu-
ity in Brazil’s strategy. Great power ambitions have guided its foreign 
policy for more than a century, regardless of government ideology or 
political regime. Contrary to Liberalism and Constructivism, alternations 
between authoritarianism and democracy, right-wing and left-wing ad-
ministrations have made little difference; for instance, the moderate-left, 
democratic Lula da Silva government (2003–2010) claimed Brazilian 
leadership in similar terms to the anti-Communist dictatorship of Gen-




eral Emílio Médici (1969–1974). This surprising congruence among 
political opposites is rooted in a “national interest” that is persistently 
promoted by a core of state officials in Brazil’s Foreign Ministry. In 
order to demonstrate this fundamental continuity – a Realist prediction 
that the changing interest group pressures of Liberalism and the norma-
tive advances of Constructivism have difficulty explaining – this essay 
provides a long-term perspective on Brazilian foreign policy. 
Realism for Late-Emerging Powers  
A Realist Core: Consensual Pursuit of a “National  
Interest” in Power Accumulation 
While the Liberal consensus (Ikenberry 2011) and ambitious institution-
building among First-World countries have led some scholars to ques-
tion the applicability of Realism to advanced industrialized nations in the 
21st century, this approach, with its focus on self-interest, security, and 
power, offers the best starting point for analyzing the international rela-
tions of contemporary developing countries (Goldgeier and McFaul 
1992: 469, 477–480, 486–488). Because these nations feel hemmed in by 
the political-military influence and economic clout of the global North-
west, they prioritize enhancing their autonomy, augmenting their power, 
and thus achieving relative gains. As anti-status-quo players seeking to 
catch up, these countries try hard to preserve their security, bolster their 
national integrity, and rise in the regional or global hierarchy. Conse-
quently, they firmly embrace the fundamental goals that drove centuries 
of Realist struggle among European countries, namely national sover-
eignty, independence, and non-intervention. At a time when advanced 
industrialized countries are moving beyond these principles, through 
means such as slowly constructing a supranational European polity, 
developing countries have – strikingly, yet logically – insisted on those 
principles to defend themselves against First-World pressures and boost 
their own international influence. The core goals that Realism has high-
lighted – national security, territorial and political integrity, and interna-
tional power – have driven foreign policy in the global South. 
While weaker nations concentrate on defensive goals, developing 
countries that command significant and growing economic and demo-
graphic clout yearn to win increasing international influence and rise on 
the global ladder. They are more ambitious than countries that have 
already “arrived” (Gilpin 1981: 162–167; see Layne 2012: 223, 232–236); 
as in Thomas Mann’s novel, newcomers try harder to advance than the 
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established Buddenbrooks. Interestingly, in this effort to move up in the 
global hierarchy, emerging powers have been inspired by earlier success 
cases (Ayoob 1995: 27, 32). In this vein, Brazil has long seen the United 
States as the example to follow. 
To these international aspirants, the overarching goal is obvious. 
This consensual goal constitutes a “national interest” in power accumula-
tion as postulated by Realism, widely shared by domestic sectors (Kras-
ner 1978: ch. 2). The pursuit of international influence is a national pre-
occupation that does not depend on specific governments, parties, or 
even the political regime. Right- and left-wing democrats and authoritari-
ans embrace this permanent national interest. In fact, as Realism pre-
dicts, the foreign policy-makers of rising nations often derive their aspi-
rations from objective factors, especially the geographically and demo-
graphically given power constellation in a region. A look at the map 
confirms that Brazil is destined to become the leader of South America 
(Schneider 1976: 32–43), and India the leader of South Asia – at least in 
the eyes of Brazilians and Indians. 
Domestic decision-making structures undergird this undisputed, 
persistent pursuit of a “national interest” in increasing relative influence. 
In developing countries, foreign policy is often controlled by a narrow 
state elite. As societal groupings and party politicians concentrate on 
domestic development and see international affairs as a low priority, state 
elites can monopolize foreign policy-making. Moreover, long stretches of 
authoritarian rule have entrenched insulated bureaucracies, especially in 
agencies dealing with fundamental state interests such as fiscal extraction 
and external relations. Democratization tends to affect foreign policy 
late, if ever. Basically, the limited involvement of society in foreign policy 
allows the “national interest” in international power accumulation to 
prevail. The process of interest definition conforms to Realist postulates 
and differs starkly from the aggregation of societal interests hypothesized 
by Liberalism. 
Due to this Realist orientation, the international norms that are 
pushed primarily by developed countries, such as environmental protec-
tion and the preservation of indigenous peoples, are widely perceived as 
obstacles to national advancement (Conklin and Graham 1995: 705). The 
state officials who determine foreign policy, along with many domestic 
sectors, view these “progressive” principles as hindrances and try to 
minimize their impact. Instead, they prioritize interests and power, em-
bracing the typically Realist skepticism about international norms. All of 
these tendencies give the foreign policies of developing countries, espe-
cially of emerging powers, a strong Realist core. 




This essay therefore argues that Realism provides the cornerstone 
for explaining international relations in the global South. At the same 
time, however, this approach must be broadened in order to capture the 
specific conditions and limitations that emerging powers face – precisely 
due to the current constellation of international power. 
The Context for Emerging Powers: Established  
Hegemony 
To grasp the rise of new powers, Realism must consider the distinct 
systemic context in which developing countries pursue their foreign 
policy goals. By highlighting the importance of the international power 
distribution, Realism is especially well-suited to understand the opportu-
nities and constraints that recent aspirants face. Precisely because today’s 
ambitious nations are latecomers, the conditions necessary for their ad-
vance are profoundly different from the parameters that early risers had 
faced,. Those established great powers, especially the US (Walt 2005: 31–
56; Ikenberry 2011), created the international system in line with their 
own needs and interests. In contrast to these system-makers, developing 
countries are mostly system-takers; they must try to get ahead in a struc-
ture molded by more advanced and more powerful players. They face 
parameters that are not of their own choosing and must make the best of 
the opportunities they have. The United States can easily, and sometimes 
almost inadvertently, reshape the world, as when the 2008 sub-prime 
crisis affected the global South. 
Thus, international latecomers face a constellation shaped by the 
frontrunners, as Gerschenkron (1965) highlighted for the field of eco-
nomic development. Ambitious middle powers must deal with estab-
lished rivals that defend their power and institutional privileges. New-
comers face a different task than the early risers when attempting to 
catch up; they must apply different means and instruments to pursue 
their Realist goals. Because Realism primarily reflects the experiences of 
the frontrunners, it requires extension. 
Situational differences are particularly pronounced when a rising as-
pirant lies in the sphere of influence claimed by a great power, especially 
the global superpower. The closer this geographic proximity and the 
starker the power differential, the tighter the constraints facing a middle 
power. “Poor Mexico, so close to the United States, and so far from 
God” – as the old saying goes – has had to moderate its aspirations and 
has eventually abandoned them, associating with the US via NAFTA. 
Located farther from the US, Brazil enjoys greater latitude (Hakim 2002), 
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although the hemispheric leader nevertheless imposes significant limita-
tions on Brazilian foreign policy. 
Most fundamentally, US predominance tightly restrains the use of 
military force, the prime instrument for conventional Realism (Gilpin 
1981; Mearsheimer 2001). In his quest for hegemony in Europe, Louis 
XIV – to name a prominent example – regarded war as a normal instru-
ment of statecraft and employed it without hesitation. Nowadays, how-
ever, the mega-power that is the United States seeks to prevent other 
countries from applying military might. US predominance prohibits 
weapons use inside its sphere of influence, especially war among its al-
lies. The quick suppression of conflicts, such as the Ecuadorian–
Peruvian border skirmishes of 1941, 1981, and 1995 and the Greek–
Turkish tensions over Cyprus, confirms the hegemon’s capacity to en-
force order. This fundamental role of a global leader prevents a rising 
middle power such as Brazil from pursuing its goals via aggression; terri-
torial conquest, which ambitious countries commonly used in earlier 
times, is out of the question. Defiance of this hegemonic prohibition 
would expose Brazil to American wrath and set back its quest for inter-
national advancement. Thus, Realist interest calculations mandate self-
limitation and force emerging powers to deviate from “offensive Real-
ism” (Mearsheimer 2001). Therefore, Brazilian advocacy of peaceful 
conflict resolution is not an indication of inherent normative commit-
ment, as postulated by Constructivism, but is instead a simple maxim of 
calculated prudence. 
While military power remains the ultima ratio of international poli-
tics, its very bases have changed as well. Economic development has 
become even more decisive for sustaining armament capabilities 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 55–56, 60–75, 143–144). In general, development is 
essential for rising powers wishing to escape from their subordinate 
position in the international power constellation. The resulting need for 
advanced technology and capital constrains rising middle powers. Be-
cause the US and its Western allies concentrate these crucial assets, ambi-
tious newcomers must cooperate economically with countries with 
which they intend to rival politically and, eventually, militarily. Thus, the 
quest for relative power highlighted by Realism forces the economic 
collaboration for mutual benefit emphasized by Liberalism.1 An over-
arching zero-sum game motivates a positive-sum game entered for in-
                                                 
1  Ikenberry (2011: ch. 4), who stresses his Liberal leanings, but bases his ap-
proach on Realist foundations as well (Ikenberry 2011: xiv, 3, 20, 22, 37, 39–47, 
57, 66, 75, 284). 




strumental purposes – a necessity that First-World-focused Realists like 
Mearsheimer (2001) have not sufficiently appreciated. 
There is a fundamental means–ends dilemma that constrains rising 
middle powers: If they want to propel their ascendance, they must fore-
swear antagonism against established powers and forgo aggression 
against their weaker neighbors. To prepare for political and, perhaps, 
military competition in the long run, ambitious nations in the global 
South must avoid political conflict and military competition in the short 
run. Instead, they must engage in economic cooperation with their future 
rivals, hoping that the absolute gain produced by this collaboration will 
yield relative gains for themselves and thus increase their power slowly 
but surely. The Liberal lure of mutual benefit is therefore designed to 
serve the Realist goal of increasing one’s own power, which commands 
primacy and uses economic collaboration merely for instrumental pur-
poses. 
Thus, great power predominance inverts Powell’s (1991) model, in 
which the specter of the use of force by potential enemies induces coun-
tries that pursue absolute gains to worry about relative gains accruing to 
those adversaries (similar point in Mearsheimer 2001: 51–52). By con-
trast, hegemony, which rules out the use of force, confines an ambitious 
aspirant to the cooperative pursuit of absolute gains, yet based on the 
hope for disproportionate payoffs and relative gains for itself. This revi-
sion suggests that Realism must be adapted to capture the constraints 
and opportunities facing developing countries. To boost their ascent, 
emerging nations need to apply different tactics than countries that are 
not in a subordinate position. As Realism itself highlights, the interna-
tional power constellation profoundly shapes state behavior. Thus, Real-
ism’s master variable informs this extension of the approach to newly 
rising powers. 
Based on the same calculation, rising countries’ attempts to estab-
lish their own spheres of influence are confined to collaborative ventures 
and economic means as well. If an ambitious aspirant employed aggres-
sive tactics, it would draw sanctions from the current hegemon and 
prompt a ring of containment among its neighbors, which would block 
its ascent. Out of self-interest, the rising nation must forgo forceful pres-
sure and instead lure its neighbors with economic cooperation. This 
effort rests on the assumption that, due to its greater weight, these col-
laborative projects will create a web of dependencies that enhance its 
asymmetrical clout and thus boost its regional leadership. This attempt 
to establish “cooperative hegemony” (Pedersen 2002) instrumentalizes 
economic relationships for power–political purposes (for a historical 
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precedent, see Hirschman 1945: 29–40). Again, mutual benefit and abso-
lute gain are expected to redound in relative gain and growing power, the 
fundamental goals of a Realist strategy. 
Last but not least, current aspirants face a welter of international in-
stitutions created at the behest of established great powers. The most 
relevant of these organizations, such as the IMF and the WTO, which 
deeply affect economic development, continue to be dominated by these 
frontrunners. This disadvantageous institutional landscape poses addi-
tional dilemmas for emerging powers. Participation is crucial for interna-
tional advancement, but institutional rules are often skewed to benefit 
established countries. Ambitious nations need to navigate carefully, take 
advantage of openings, and advocate reforms designed to obtain higher 
pay-offs. However, any push for radical change would drive away the 
current global leaders and condemn the institution to irrelevance (Kras-
ner 1985). Therefore, the existing institutional system – a product of the 
uneven international power constellation – seriously limits aspirants’ 
room to maneuver. 
In conclusion, the prior advancement of frontrunners that have en-
trenched an international hierarchy has transformed the context in which 
rising middle powers pursue their ambitions. The veryquest for power, 
the prototypical Realist goal, now requires an avoidance of typical Realist 
means, especially military force. Instead, economic cooperation with 
advanced countries and regional neighbors and pragmatic participation 
in skewed international institutions have become decisive. These new 
requirements and constraints operate globally and affect all ambitious 
developing countries. However, they are strongest in regions where es-
tablished great powers wield particular influence, such as Latin America 
(Escudé 1998: 60–70; Donnelly 2006; Lake 2009; Ikenberry 2011). 
The Realist Strategy of an Aspiring Great  
Power: Brazil 
These theoretical ideas elucidate the foreign policy of Brazil, which seeks 
leadership in South America and increasing global influence (see recently 
Burges 2009). Interestingly, its geostrategic location makes Brazil an 
“unlikely case” of an emerging power: Lying in the US’s direct sphere of 
influence, Brazil faces serious obstacles to its ambitions. Despite advanc-
ing globalization, geography still matters. Accordingly, Mexico has fore-
gone independent leadership and embraced the US via NAFTA. Dis-
tance from the global superpower, by contrast, makes it much easier to 
rise, as China’s growing clout and increasing assertiveness have shown. 




While less constrained than Mexico, Brazil faces much greater diffi-
culty than China. Its location in the Western hemisphere requires cau-
tion. To prevent the hegemon United States from stifling its rise, Brazil 
must avoid confrontation, foreswear military means, emphasize econom-
ic cooperation, and hope that asymmetrical growth rates and differential 
clout will turn mutual absolute benefit into increasing relative influence. 
If a country hemmed in by these constraints still seeks to boost its inter-
national power and pursues this goal in a persistent, systematic, and 
comprehensive way, then a Realist interpretation will find special valida-
tion (similar Schirm 2005; Amorim 2014: 160–164, 169–171, 176). 
Realist Cornerstone: Brazil’s National Interest in Power 
Accumulation 
The lodestar of Brazilian foreign policy has long been the quest for na-
tional power. In line with Realism, foreign policymakers have read this 
fundamental aspiration off the map. Because Brazil is by far the largest 
and most populous nation in South America, the country’s leaders have 
long viewed it as destined for continental leadership and global influence. 
Brasília perceives the pursuit of international power as grounded in ob-
jective reality; the country ought to play the hand it has been dealt by 
geography and demography (Burges 2009: 36–41). Followed by govern-
ments of all stripes – authoritarian and democratic, left- and right-wing 
(Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009: 11, 82) – this goal constitutes a national 
interest à la Realism. It does not emerge from interest group pressures or 
party competition, as Liberalism claims. Instead, it is Brazil’s “manifest 
destiny,” equivalent to the notion guiding the 19th-century United States. 
Promoted by the Brazilian state, this national interest has found wide-
spread societal support (Schirm 2005: 113–114). 
Brazil has pursued national power and international leadership in a 
coherent long-run trajectory. In the early 20th century, the father of Bra-
zilian foreign policy, the Baron of Rio Branco, managed to assert territo-
rial claims and enlarge the country westward. Since then, borders have 
remained fixed. The fear of provoking a ring of containment by the 
Spanish-speaking neighbors and the expanding hegemony of the US, 
which disliked trouble in its sphere of influence and suppressed armed 
conflict, ruled out territorial conquest. Consequently, Brazil has used 
other means to tie its smaller, weaker neighbors slowly into asymmetrical 
linkages and make them dependent, as analyzed below. 
Increasing Brazil’s national power and international clout has re-
mained the country’s fundamental goal to the present day. What the 
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Baron of Rio Branco initiated (Bueno 2012: 171–173), subsequent gov-
ernments of all stripes have continued. This persistent goal pursuit is 
noteworthy. While the military regime (1964–1985) advertised this Real-
ist quest openly with its slogan “Brasil Grande,” later democratic admin-
istrations have followed the same orientation, for instance by seeking a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Although this longstanding 
initiative has minimal concrete benefit for a developing country still 
plagued by grave domestic problems, it represented an attempt to ce-
ment Brazil’s claim of undisputed regional leadership and enhance its 
influence by inducing its neighbors to advance their foreign policy initia-
tives via their “big brother”.2 What the anti-Communist generals had 
sowed, the leader of the socialist Workers’ Party, Lula da Silva (president 
2003–2010), tried to harvest by achieving this institutional victory.3 
Brazil’s effort to boost its power qualifies as a national interest in 
Realist terms. This goal has been widely shared by foreign policymakers 
from the ideological right and left, in government and in opposition, and 
under democratic and authoritarian regimes. This persistent quest fulfills 
Krasner’s (1978: 35, 42–45) criteria for a national interest: constancy and 
autonomy. First, the continuous pursuit of this goal over a century 
shows that it is a national interest sustained by the state, not the specific 
aspiration of shifting government leaders. Second, this longstanding goal 
did not arise from the personal interests of state officials or from interest 
group pressure, such as business lobbies. For most of the 20th century, 
entrepreneurs had minimal influence on foreign policy. Moreover, the 
sectoral composition of business has shifted greatly; pressures from a 
changing private sector cannot account for the unchanging pursuit of the 
same goal. Therefore, a Liberal interpretation is not persuasive. Realism 
is more convincing: A self-perpetuating cadre of state actors, especially 
Brazil’s insulated, professional diplomats, has led the definition and pur-
suit of this national interest.4 
This close-knit group of state officials has long run foreign policy 
and guaranteed continuity (Amorim 2014: 154, 160–164, 169, 173, 176). 
                                                 
2  Showing longstanding continuity in its foreign policy, Brazil pursued this goal 
during the UN’s foundation in the mid-1940s (Burges 2009: 21) and even in the 
League of Nations after the First World War (Smith 2010: 81, 86–87). 
3  While Vigevani and Cepaluni (2009: 3, 7, 11, 31, 53, 63) highlighted the differ-
ences in the specific foreign-policy approaches that Brazil has pursued over 
time, they also acknowledge the fundamental continuity of the country’s quest 
for greater “autonomy” and influence over the last few decades. 
4  Even under democracy, its predominance and cohesion has only slowly started 
to erode (Cason and Power 2009; Saraiva 2010; Amorim 2014: 129–136). 




Merit-based recruitment and first-rate training have bred a strong esprit 
de corps, which has cemented commitment to Brazil’s national interest 
(Schneider 1976: 87–89, 96–97). These diplomats have advanced the 
permanent goals of the state, whether the government happened to be 
democratic or authoritarian or whether it hailed from the right or the 
left. As an “island of excellence” inside the Brazilian state, this diplomat-
ic corps approximates the notion of “unitary rational actor” postulated 
by Realism (Hirst 2005: 2, 41; Amorim 2014: 173). Thus, the longstand-
ing promotion of Brazil’s great power aspirations has a clear institutional 
protagonist and bureaucratic carrier. Consciously pursued by a distinct 
group of actors, this Realist motivation is more easily observable and 
visible than in the US, for which Krasner (1978) designed his analytical 
strategy of inferring a national interest. 
Brazil’s quest for influence drives its foreign policy behavior as a 
“revealed preference.” This self-interest causes the striking inconsistency 
of Brasília’s adherence to international norms. The country eagerly put 
strong pressure on its weak neighbor Paraguay to safeguard democracy, 
but was reluctant to support US pressures for democracy in Peru in 2000 
and Venezuela in 2014–2015; however, Brazil claimed to have defended 
democracy in Honduras in 2009, again in opposition to US efforts. 
These twists and turns are incoherent from a normative standpoint and 
therefore cast doubt on a Constructivist interpretation. However, these 
inconsistencies follow a Realist logic: Brazil pressures weak neighbors, 
yet resists what it sees as attempts to reinforce US hegemony in the 
Western hemisphere (Burges and Daudelin 2007: 115–129, especially 
128–129; Hirst 2005: 45–47). 
Some scholars have taken the absence of militarized power politics 
as proof that Brazilian foreign policy is an instrument for domestic de-
velopment, as Liberalism would claim. In fact, Brazilian diplomats have 
downplayed or denied the quest for political power (Burges 2009: 1, 4–8, 
12, 41–43, 46, 62). According to these views, Brazil’s international strate-
gy diverges categorically from earlier great powers, which rose via mili-
tary strength; for instance, underdeveloped Brandenburg–Prussia gained 
influence through its armies. How different is contemporary Brazil, 
which spends strikingly little on defense and instead declares socioeco-
nomic development as its overriding priority. The hunger for butter 
seems to have pushed aside any desire for guns. 
However, this Liberal view confounds instruments with goals and 
overlooks the pragmatic, typically Realist adaptation to new realities, 
namely the opportunities and constraints of the contemporary interna-
tional system. Because the global power constellation has changed pro-
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foundly with US predominance and because Brazil’s position diverges 
starkly from earlier rising powers, Realism itself predicts that the ways 
and means differ with whichthe country advances its foreign policy 
goals, compared to the tactics used by earlier great powers for their rise. 
These goals, however, which are the cornerstone of Brazil’s foreign poli-
cy, embody the Realist quest for national power and international leader-
ship, which all influential actors in the Brazilian state and society have 
shared (Schirm 2005: 113–114) and pursued with great consistency. 
Most Brazilian policymakers have deliberately avoided announcing 
their quest for regional leadership because their South American neigh-
bors are allergic to this ambition (Malamud 2011) and watch the luso-
phone giant with suspicion (Smith 2010: 2, 30, 86, 187). Brasília has 
feared a backlash, especially a ring of containment by the Spanish-
speaking countries or defensive alliances with the US (cf. Walt 2005: 
187–191). Official denials of Brazil’s Realist ambitions (Burges 2009: 1, 
4, 6, 8, 12, 41, 43, 46, 62) are a deliberate tactic to diminish obstacles to 
these Realist ambitions. 
Downplaying military aspects of power and concentrating on its 
economic bases actually furthers Brazil’s quest for influence, especially 
vis-à-vis Argentina, the one neighbor that historically competed with 
Brazil for regional leadership. For decades, Brazil avoided an arms race 
with Buenos Aires. But from the 1970s onward, both countries’ devel-
opment of nuclear energy threatened to unleash a dangerous form of 
competition. Strong pressure from the US eventually precluded any mili-
tary usage. Interestingly, this concession to the hegemon actually benefit-
ed Brazil’s regional quest for power. Whereas Argentina equals Brazil in 
terms of atomic capabilities, it is far inferior in terms of economic clout. 
Therefore, stopping nuclear competition and privileging economic rela-
tions favored Brazil’s aspirations for South American leadership. 
In general, socioeconomic development is not an alternative to na-
tional power, but a decisive precondition, particularly for a developing 
country. A poor, backward nation cannot boost its international influ-
ence. Therefore, the quests for power and development often coincide. 
But power has priority. This rank order became evident when Brazil 
helped to block the US’s plan to establish a hemispheric free-trade zone. 
While the FTAA promised to stimulate trade, investment, and growth in 
line with Liberalism, Brazil forewent absolute economic gains for fear of 
cementing its subordination to the US and incurring a permanent loss in 
relative power. This conflict revealed Brazil’s fundamental goal, namely 
the Realist quest for international influence. 




To conclude, national power and global clout are the priorities that 
have driven Brazilian foreign policy for more than a century. Qualifying 
as “national interests” à la Realism, these aspirations have guided gov-
ernments of all stripes. 
Opening Space for Further Advance: Brazil’s Role in 
International Institutions 
In the Realist view advanced here, what is the position of rising middle 
powers vis-à-vis the established international institutions? How do for-
eign policymakers who see their country as predestined for regional lead-
ership and international clout view the global order? The progress that 
these emerging nations have already achieved and the prospect of further 
advancement has discouraged a radical revamping of international insti-
tutions and has instead counseled pragmatic efforts to use existing op-
portunities and patiently enhance these openings. For a rising country 
like Brazil, playing by the existing rules has yielded substantial benefits; 
non-confrontational reforms can further boost these benefits. These 
perceptions, which reflect the recent past and realistically project it into 
the future, have prompted a bargaining strategy in which Brazil tena-
ciously tries to tilt the balance of costs and benefits in its favor and 
achieve greater influence in important international institutions. For this 
purpose, Brazil has sought alliances with other rising powers and dog-
gedly engaged in negotiations with established nations. 
For decades, Brazil has followed this pragmatic approach and re-
jected frontal attacks on the global order. This prudent pursuit of self-
interest came to the fore in the 1970s, when a broad coalition of devel-
oping countries, inspired by OPEC’s success in global wealth redistribu-
tion, demanded a transformation of international capitalism. A New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) should defend underdeveloped 
nations against the rapacity of multinational corporations, boost the 
prices of their commodity exports, and provide special advantages to the 
poorest countries. While Latin American countries such as Mexico (long 
before NAFTA) and Venezuela became leaders of this movement for 
profound global change, Brazil acted with caution. As a rising middle 
power, it was reluctant to disturb the global economy and had no interest 
in international leveling. Seeing itself as a future developed country, it 
displayed limited solidarity with its poorer, weaker brethren (Selcher 
1978). Moreover, Brazilian policymakers did not want to scare away the 
multinational companies that propelled its impressive drive toward in-
dustrialization. Continued cooperation with the global Northwest was 
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decisive for making further advances with a development strategy that 
had produced a good deal of economic growth and technological pro-
gress. 
Using the NIEO as a bargaining chip, Brazil preferred patient nego-
tiations inside the institutional framework created by the First World, 
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In its 
result-oriented perspective, GATT could yield real benefits, in contrast 
to the rhetorical fireworks of the NIEO demands. Brazil pushed for 
trade concessions from the North and strategically invoked the Liberal 
principles of established institutions to combat rising protectionism, 
which hurt its increasingly competitive exports. This bargaining ap-
proach did not frontally challenge the international order, which had 
enabled Brazil to rise above the rest of the global South, but sought 
reforms to accelerate its own rise further (Selcher 1978; cf. Ikenberry 
2011: 282, 341). 
Brazil has continued to follow this self-interested approach. As an 
active participant in the World Trade Organization, it has persistently 
counteracted restrictions imposed by First World countries and opened 
up additional opportunities for its own industries and commodity ex-
ports (Hurrell 2005: 80–81; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009: 69–73). In a 
thoroughly prepared effort, for instance, Brazil used WTO dispute set-
tlement mechanisms to contest US cotton subsidies, achieving an em-
blematic victory (Shaffer et al. 2008; Hirst 2005: 29–32). Interestingly, 
while the outcome benefited Brazil, it hurt poorer cotton producers in 
Africa (Pelc 2014). In sum, rather than attacking international institutions 
as bastions of “hegemonic stability,” Brasília has turned their mecha-
nisms against their initial creators and beaten them with their own weap-
ons. In this way, Brazil has promoted its narrow self-interests in a  
hard-nosed yet non-confrontational fashion (Cason and Power 2009: 
129–130). 
Typical of Realism, this pragmatic strategy relies on state power to 
garner benefits for Brazil and to protect and foster domestic develop-
ment. It diverges from economic Liberalism by rejecting a free-market 
approach. Policymakers fear that unfettered global competition would 
overwhelm emerging industries, smother Brazil’s ascent, and cement 
First World predominance. Just as Brazil kept its distance from the so-
cialist-inspired NIEO proposal, it remained wary of the free-trade prin-
ciples pushed by the US. When Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. 
Bush promoted a Free Trade Area of the Americas, Brazil persistently 
dragged its feet (Hirst 2005: 32–38, 46; Hurrell 2005: 82–83, 104–105; 
Teixeira 2011). Too diplomatic to antagonize the Western hegemon with 




a clear “No” – as Hugo Chávez delighted in doing – Brazil did not want 
to open its economy and remain defenseless against the powerful eco-
nomic forces of the North (Daudelin and Burges 2011: 36–41). This 
passive resistance was meant to maintain political independence and 
safeguard the longstanding great power ambitions (Schirm 2005: 119–
121). Brazil was determined not to become an appendage of the US in 
the same way as it felt Mexico had done through NAFTA (cf. Hakim 
2002). Thus, Brazil’s opposition to the FTAA corroborates a Realist 
interpretation over the Liberal alternative. 
The Realist quest for power has also induced Brazil to go beyond 
efforts to modify international institutions for the sake of economic 
benefits. Brazil has increasingly pushed for more political influence, such 
as greater voting rights in the International Monetary Fund and a perma-
nent seat on the UN Security Council (Schirm 2005: 113–117; Soares de 
Lima 2010: 8–15). However, in pursuing its political self-interest, Brazil 
has not advocated reforms inspired by the “democratic” principle of one 
country one vote, which would greatly dilute its influence in the sea of 
the global South. Instead, it has pushed for changes that reflect its grow-
ing economic clout and political influence and thereby privilege Brazil as 
a leader of the developing countries. Driven by its Realist national inter-
est, Brasília does not seek global equality, but its own climb in the peck-
ing order of global inequality (Schirm 2005: 113, 117, 125–126). Brazil is 
eager to join the select club of great powers; it does not want to over-
come power as the organizing principle of the global order and replace it 
with international law, which – based on the maxim of state sovereignty 
– would mandate equal treatment for all nations (as in the UN General 
Assembly). Once again, Realism is more persuasive than Constructivism. 
In sum, Brazil’s strategy in international institutions reflects its over-
riding quest for national power and international influence, which has 
also prompted the instrumental pursuit of economic development. Polit-
ical goals drive the long-term effort to reshape the global order gradually 
so that the country can rise even faster. Unwilling to jeopardize an insti-
tutional edifice that has allowed it to achieve considerable progress, Bra-
zil avoids the extremes of economic Liberalism and “Socialist” Third 
Worldism. This rising power is demanding a seat at the First World table 
and shows limited concern for large parts of the global South, which are 
left outside the door. As Realism would expect, Brazil is determined to 
propel its own rise in the global power ranking. 
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Ambivalent Relationship with the Hegemonic Power 
The challenges, opportunities, and constraints that a rising middle power 
faces come to a head in its dealings with the established leaders of the 
global system. These dilemmas are especially acute when the internation-
al power constellation approaches unipolarity, as occurred after the end 
of the Cold War. The fact that this middle power also lies in the sphere 
of influence claimed by the one remaining superpower further exacer-
bates these conflicting imperatives. Contemporary Brazil faces precisely 
this complicated situation, which is alleviated by the fact that it does not 
border the US, unlike Mexico. 
Another twist that Brazil faces is the fact that foreign policy elites 
have traditionally seen the US as the main model to imitate. The eco-
nomic prosperity, political clout, and military prowess of the North 
American powerhouse have long attracted global respect. Brazilian poli-
cy-makers have perceived – or projected – specific parallels. In the 19th 
century, the US claimed a “manifest destiny” to extend its territory and 
become the undisputed hegemon of North America. In a similar (but 
more constrained) way, Brazil rounded off its territory in the early 20th 
century and has long believed it is predestined to become the leading 
power in South America. Consequently, its Realist quest for growing 
clout seeks to replicate the US trajectory. Inspired by the frontrunner’s 
success, Brazil’s foreign policymakers believe that their country can 
achieve a similar ascent, sooner or later. Typical of Realism, this convic-
tion is grounded in objective facts, especially Brazil’s enormous size and 
demographic weight. South America’s map corroborates the validity of 
Brazil’s national aspirations – as the US inferred its manifest destiny 
from North America’s map. 
Of course, the parallels end when considering the reach of Ameri-
can predominance. Beyond turning the circum-Caribbean into its “back-
yard,” the Northern superpower has also exerted strong influence in 
South America. Washington has pursued this goal via innumerable uni-
lateral initiatives, exemplified by severe pressures on the Allende gov-
ernment in Chile (1970–1973) and comprehensive support for the Uribe 
administration in Colombia (2002–2010). Moreover, the Northern 
hegemon has institutionalized its influence through multilateral fora, 
especially the Organization of American States. 
Consequently, the US is both Brazil’s traditional role model and its 
primary rival (Hurrell 2005: 98–100). Driven by the Realist quest for 
relative clout, Brazil’s rise would come at the expense of US influence. 
Accordingly, even the anti-Communist dictators of the 1970s, despite 
being ideologically aligned with the US, soon charted a surprisingly au-




tonomous course and opportunistically disregarded US interests. For 
instance, in order to boost Brazilian influence through close links to its 
“neighbors across the sea,” the newly independent lusophone brethren 
of Angola and Mozambique, Brazil’s conservative military regime recog-
nized Marxist “liberation” movements that fought fierce civil wars 
against groupings supported by the US. Furthermore, in order to pro-
mote its nascent arms industry, Brazil pragmatically sold weapons to 
various Arab countries, including US enemies and notorious rogue re-
gimes, such as Libya under Gaddafi (Zirker 1994: 125–126). To boost its 
own power interests, Brazil has not hesitated to act at cross-purposes 
with the US – non-confrontational in style, but firm in purpose. 
Bolstered by its gradual rise, Brazil has also come to diverge from 
the Northern hegemon inside the Western hemisphere. In the 1980s 
already, Brazil supported the Contadora Group’s attempts to seek a 
negotiated settlement of the Central American conflicts that deeply in-
volved the US, although it cautiously avoided a central role in this far-
away effort. After the debt crisis and subsequent market reforms coun-
seled greater deference to the US for several years (Vigevani and Cepalu-
ni 2009: ch. 2–3), Brazil in the new millennium charted an increasingly 
independent course. For instance, the country bailed out George W. 
Bush’s nemesis Chávez during a severe oil strike in early 2003, and in 
2009 opposed the opening of new US military bases in Colombia to 
prevent the global superpower from gaining a firmer foothold in Brazil’s 
emerging sphere of influence, South America. 
For the first time, the Northern hegemon faces a rising rival inside 
its own hemisphere. While Brazil has always operated pragmatically, 
pursued concrete national interests, and avoided open defiance, disa-
greements have slowly extended from specific economic issues to broad-
er political questions. For instance, as the bailout of Chávez and the 
accommodating response to Bolivia’s ostentatious “nationalization” of 
voluminous Petrobras holdings in 2006 (Cason and Power 2009: 133–
134; Malamud 2011: 13–14) suggest, Brazil has courted left-wing neigh-
bors that chart a nationalist course and stoke hostility to the US. While 
Brazilian diplomats abhor such noisy tactics and tried to contain Chá-
vez’s protagonism (El País 2006), ideological division in the Western 
hemisphere has enhanced Brazil’s clout as reasonable “moderating pow-
er.” Moreover, Chávez’s mismanagement of Venezuela’s oil boom ena-
bled Brazil to supply billions of dollars’ worth of products and services 
(Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009: 121–127). Thus, leftwing regimes that the 
US opposes have opened up political and economic opportunities for 
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Brazil, which the country uses for furthering its advance, rather than 
deferentially siding with the US. 
Yet, while Brazil has pursued its self-interests even at the risk of 
displeasing the regional hegemon, it has always avoided confrontation. 
Overwhelming US power has ruled out open antagonism, not to speak 
of direct military competition (Hurrell 2005: 100). Whereas Branden-
burg–Prussia boosted its armed strength inside the Holy Roman Empire 
and soon after confronted the Habsburg Emperors in war, Brazil has 
cautiously refrained from frontally challenging US “hierarchy” in the 
Western hemisphere. Instead, the lusophone aspirant has only sought 
“soft balancing against the United States” (Pape 2005), first through 
economic integration with its Southern Cone neighbors (MERCOSUL) 
and more recently through a political cooperation mechanism in South 
America (UNASUR; both are examined below) and through extra-
regional outreach via the BRICS group. 
The main reason is that to continue and accelerate its rise, Brazil 
needs economic cooperation with advanced industrialized countries, 
particularly the United States. The Northern rival commands tremen-
dous economic clout through its control over capital and modern tech-
nology. Ambitious newcomers need these resources, especially when 
global unipolarity rules out military might and turns economic develop-
ment into the main arena of competition for international power. Ironi-
cally, given its long-term goal of rivaling the US, Brazil currently needs 
economic collaboration with the US. Current partnership is meant to 
prepare the country for future competition for predominance. Brazil 
intends to turn mutual absolute benefit, the crucial promise of economic 
cooperation according to Liberalism, in an asymmetrical direction to 
enhance its relative clout in line with Realism. By pursuing this nested 
strategy, the country hopes to use its future rival to boost its current 
advance. 
While Brazil’s long-term perspective foresees a zero-sum game with 
the US for relative influence, its present weakness compels the country 
to play a positive-sum game with the Northern powerhouse to achieve 
economic gain and national development. American investments are 
important for upgrading Brazil’s industrial and agro-export capacity and 
for fueling its technological advancement. The enormous US market is a 
prized target for exports. Moreover, US universities have trained thou-
sands of Brazilians in science and engineering. While Brazil maintains 
intense economic relations with numerous countries and enjoys a diversi-
fied profile of international trade and investment, the US remains vital 
for its future development, a precondition for increasing national power. 




The enormous size of the United States economy makes cooperation 
especially important for Brazil. Therefore, the Southern aspirant is cur-
rently quite dependent on the Northern hegemon. 
For now, these strong economic ties limit the pursuit of Brazil’s di-
vergent political interests and rule out any open rivalry. In order to avoid 
jeopardizing its further advance, Brazil cannot afford to antagonize the 
US. For years to come, Brazil needs economic cooperation with the 
country that it eventually wants to equal, if not overtake in national pow-
er. This instrumental collaboration rests on the hope that these econom-
ic exchanges will yield disproportionate benefits for Brazil. Policymakers 
trust in their country’s economic dynamism, which often produces high-
er growth rates than in the US. In this view, cooperation with the US 
yields relative benefits for Brazil and allows the ambitious Southern giant 
to gradually catch up to its Northern role model (as Japan did to the U.S. 
in earlier decades). Thus, the economic exchanges promoted by Liberal-
ism are designed to serve the power goals highlighted by Realism. 
The current need for economic cooperation with the US restricts 
how Brazil can advance its political interests and rules out any military 
pressure. So how can Brazil extend its influence and establish regional 
leadership in South America, a crucial step toward growing international 
influence? Brasília perceives the US, with its global political–military 
responsibilities and the gradual erosion of its economic predominance, as 
leaving a power vacuum in the subcontinent that the regional aspirant 
can cautiously fill. With US interests focused elsewhere, such as the Mid-
dle East and China, the global superpower may not (sufficiently) mind 
that its emerging intra-hemispheric rival is slowly turning into the guar-
antor of political order in its own neighborhood. The next section exam-
ines how Brasília has envisioned this effort. 
Seeking Regional Leadership 
To bolster its rise, Brazil has pursued the typical Realist goal of con-
structing its own sphere of influence. However, the constraints it faces as 
a latecomer have meant that this project also de-emphasizes military 
power and primarily uses economic cooperation, which – given the dif-
ference in national clout – is bound to tie its neighbors into asymmetrical 
dependencies (Daudelin and Burges 2011: 46). Thus, like its dealings 
with the global hegemon, Brazil’s relations with countries lower in the 
international pecking order have a Realist core and seek relative political 
gain and power, but employ non-confrontational, collaborative means. 
They invoke the Liberal promise of mutual benefit for the Realist end of 
promoting Brazilian power. Accordingly, Brasília seeks to establish a 
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“cooperative hegemony” (Pedersen 2002; Burges 2008; Teixeira 2011: 
201–207). 
For many years, Brazil’s geographic distance to its neighbors across 
the impenetrable Amazon meant that the goal of fortifying its perimeter 
had much lower priority than was the case for earlier great powers, such 
as France in the 17th to 19th centuries. As Argentina was Brazil’s only 
serious rival, foreign policy-makers adopted the typical safeguard advo-
cated by European Realpolitik in creating a buffer state, Uruguay (Smith 
2010: 16–17). However, since the defeat of Paraguay’s adventurous ex-
pansionism in a brutal war (1864–1870), armed force has played a subor-
dinate role in Brazil’s relations in South America. For the country’s long-
term goal, it would be counter-productive to push its military weight 
around. Confrontational moves would induce its neighbors to form a 
defensive alliance against Brazil or seek US protection. Given the current 
distribution of international power, prudence demands that Brazil forgo 
military means. 
Brasília has been especially careful to avoid stirring up its old rivalry 
with Argentina, which remains averse to recognizing its predominance.5 
The lusophone giant wants to avert a counter-balancing coalition that 
could include Peru and Venezuela and thereby create a wall of contain-
ment. In the mid-1970s, anti-Communist dictators ruled Brazil while 
Argentina and Venezuela enjoyed democracy and Peru was under a 
“progressive” military regime; during this time, Brazilian policy-makers 
feared such “encirclement” (cerco). In recent years, the close ties between 
Venezuela’s Chávez and the Kirchner governments in Argentina also ran 
counter to Brazilian ambitions, especially because Venezuela’s populist 
president claimed regional leadership and used billions of petrodollars to 
buy diplomatic support in Buenos Aires (Gómez Mera 2014: 189–190, 
216). In response, Brazil forged close economic links to Venezuela, try-
ing to contain Chávez and limit his ambitions (El País 2006), while molli-
fying Argentina through disproportionate trade concessions. 
Facing suspicious neighbors (Malamud 2011) and the hegemonic 
US, Brazil’s effort to expand its regional influence has deliberately avoid-
ed any forceful pressures and has used the lure of economic benefits. 
Foreign policy-makers have promoted economic cooperation, assuming 
that their country’s disproportionate weight will inevitably make any 
collaboration asymmetrical. The partner’s growing dependence on Brazil 
will then cement the leadership of this rising middle power. Interestingly, 
                                                 
5  For instance, Argentina strongly opposed Brazil’s demand for a permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council (Schirm 2005: 117; Malamud 2011: 9–11). 




Brazil is applying the same mechanism as in its relations with the US, but 
hopes that the development and size gradient will work in opposite di-
rections, benefiting Brazil both vis-à-vis the stronger and more advanced 
United States and its weaker neighbors. Accordingly, Brazil applies in 
South America similar tactics to the use of economic cooperation for 
purposes of political power and regional hegemony that Albert Hirsch-
man (1945) analyzed in his seminal study of the international political 
economy of Realism. 
For this purpose, Brazil has established closer economic ties to its 
neighbors, especially through massive investments in Bolivia’s natural gas 
industry and the enormous hydroelectric dam at Itaipu with Paraguay 
(Zirker 1994: 122–124). Since the 1990s, Brazil has also promoted infra-
structural integration in South America to facilitate greater trade (Burges 
2009: 25–26, 30, 101, 113–123, 185). Peru has been a special target for 
Brazilian road-building efforts. While the resource constraints of a de-
veloping country have limited these initiatives, they have also slowly tied 
its neighbors into an ever denser web of linkages (Burges 2008: 78). 
Crucially for Brazil’s Realist strategy, these cooperative ventures are 
inherently asymmetrical: They make neighbors dependent on the luso-
phone giant and allocate the fruits of cooperation unequally (Burges 
2009: 60–61, 94–123). When nationalistic governments in Bolivia and 
Paraguay demanded redress in recent years, Brazil avoided confrontation 
and made economic concessions to preserve relationships with long-
term political payoffs. Accordingly, after Bolivia ostentatiously national-
ized large holdings of the national oil company Petrobras, the Lula ad-
ministration sought reconciliation to keep Bolivia firmly tied into the 
Brazilian orbit (La Razón 2007; Cason and Power 2009: 133–134; Mal-
amud 2011: 12–14). 
Brazil has also pursued politically motivated cooperation through 
multilateral initiatives, especially the Common Market of the South 
(MERCOSUL). By boosting trade and investment among Southern 
Cone countries in the 1990s, this integration scheme furthered Brazil’s 
goal of using economic exchanges to gain political influence. Even after 
economic crises undid these concrete payoffs, Brazil kept promoting this 
trade pact as a major foreign policy initiative in South America (Cason 
and Power 2009: 133). This priority, emphasized against severe econom-
ic odds and at the cost of accommodating Argentina’s special demands, 
reveals the political rationale driving Brazil’s relations to its neighbors. 
Brazil has seen MERCOSUL as a sub-regional alliance that strengthens 
its political hand and bargaining position vis-à-vis the US (Gómez Mera 
2014: 7, 25–26, 55, 73–74, 145–148, 156, 184–185, 208–209). Through 
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this coalition with its Southern Cone neighbors, Brazil engages in “soft 
balancing against the United States” (Pape 2005). When the emerging 
power had to engage the United States’ push for a hemispheric free trade 
zone, MERCOSUL played a crucial role for sustaining Brazil’s defensive 
posture and passive resistance (Teixeira 2011). 
With its growing international clout, Brazil has recently expanded 
this regional multilateralism via the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR). Seeing the sub-continent as its own sphere of influence, 
Brasília has promoted political cooperation, especially to address crises 
among its neighbors, such as the fierce regional conflicts in Bolivia in 
2008 and the protest wave in Venezuela in 2014. By cautiously leading 
efforts to resolve these issues from inside the region, Brazil has sought to 
forestall US involvement, whether it proceeds unilaterally or via the Or-
ganization of American States (Hirst 2005: 45–47; Spektor 2010: 202–
203; Daudelin and Burges 2011: 50–58). Through UNASUR, Brazil is 
starting to establish its political leadership in South America (Saraiva 
2010: 160–161; Trinkunas 2014: 16–19) and to strengthen its soft balanc-
ing against the US. 
In sum, Brazil’s relations with its neighbors have been similar to its 
dealings with the US – and equally instrumental. Driven by the Realist 
goal of enhancing its national power and international clout, but facing 
an entrenched hegemon, Brazil has realistically foregone typically Realist 
means and has instead relied on economic cooperation.6 The underlying 
hope is that mutual gain will result in disproportionate benefit for Brazil 
and thus increase the country’s relative clout, steadily eroding the US’s 
advantage while establishing its own leadership in South America and 
beyond. Thus, Brazil has tried to use a positive-sum game in the eco-
nomic sphere in order to advance in an overarching zero-sum game over 
international influence. By downplaying the quest for power at the mo-
ment, Brazil intends to lay the ground for a successful bid for power 
later on. 
Conclusion 
Recent years have seen a lively discussion about “the end of Internation-
al Relations theory” (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013). Leading scholars 
have supported (Lake 2013) or bemoaned (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013) 
                                                 
6  In line with Realism, now that Brazil is gaining international influence, there 
have been calls for the increased acquisition and usage of hard, military power 
(Bertonha 2010). 




the fact that the field has left behind debates over paradigms and has 
moved to the pragmatic construction of eclectic explanations and the 
empirical testing of specific hypotheses. However, paradigmatic thinking 
has great value in that it clarifies and systematizes analysis. Eclecticism 
can become muddled; the reliance on a variety of factors can discourage 
hard thinking. Mere hypothesis testing can yield countless narrow find-
ings that fail to add up to an interesting big picture. 
To advance theory development, I have sought to demonstrate that 
Brazilian foreign policy has followed a coherent Realist strategy designed 
to turn this huge nation into a regional great power and influential global 
player. While these goals have left room for significant shifts in foreign 
policy tactics (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009), they have consistently guid-
ed a diverse range of governments, both right-wing and left-wing, au-
thoritarian and democratic. As Realism argues, there has been striking 
continuity in Brazil’s international approach, driven by the quest for 
regional power and global clout. 
For Brazil as a latecomer, however, the existing constellation of in-
ternational power, especially the predominance of the United States, has 
necessitated tactics for advancing its Realist ambitions that differ clearly 
from those of earlier great powers. Brazil must forgo typical means high-
lighted by Realists, especially military might, in order to avoid prompting 
an overwhelming reaction from the US and triggering a defensive alli-
ance among its neighbors, which would thwart Brazil’s ambitions. In-
stead of applying the confrontational approach with which traditional 
great powers propelled their rise (cf. Gilpin 1981), Brazil must rely on 
cooperation, assuming that the resulting absolute benefits will yield rela-
tive gains for itself. Accordingly, by collaborating with the US, Brazil 
hopes that its dynamic economy will achieve higher growth rates than 
the satiated, sectorally declining colossus of the North. In its joint ven-
tures with its smaller, weaker neighbors, Brazil hopes to establish de-
pendencies that tie these countries into its own sphere of influence. 
Thus, while using the promise of mutual benefit to promote coopera-
tion, Brazil is pursuing ulterior motives focused on the asymmetrical 
accumulation of power. By examining the main arenas of Brazilian for-
eign policy, this essay has traced the tightrope that Realist foreign policy-
makers must cross while being constrained by an established hegemon. 
The impact of these constraints becomes obvious in a comparison 
with China, which has followed a similar approach to Brazil by seeking 
increasing international power at the same time as needing economic 
cooperation with its future rival – the United States (Deng 2008: 2–3, 
16–17, 21, 121–123, 167–168; Feng 2008: 39–44, 50–53; Goldstein 2008: 
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61–63). The Middle Kingdom, however, faces fewer limitations than 
Brazil because it lies outside the US’s regional sphere of influence. 
Moreover, China acquired nuclear arms early and thus gained admission 
to the cartel of global great powers, as certified by its permanent seat on 
the UN Security Council (Brazil’s longstanding yet elusive goal). For 
these reasons, China commands greater room to maneuver than the 
lusophone aspirant. 
As my Realist interpretation expects, China has relied more on tra-
ditional means for increasing its power, especially military might. This 
propensity was especially high when the country was isolated from the 
international community, as the 1979 war with Vietnam showed. How-
ever, even after opening up to the global economy and establishing am-
ple cooperation with Western countries, China has “pushed its weight 
around” more aggressively than Brazil (Tan 2012), as its sabre rattling in 
the South China Sea demonstrates (Johnston 2013: 17, 19, 31, 45). Inter-
estingly, this more traditionally Realist behavior prevails only in China’s 
own sphere of influence. In its ever-growing incursions into Latin Amer-
ica, the backyard claimed by the US, the Asian power has deliberately 
avoided military initiatives. By concentrating with calculated pragmatism 
on economic cooperation, China has acted in Latin America just like 
Brazil. Thus, it has flexibly adjusted its tactics to regional power constel-
lations (Deng 2008: 22, 55, 245–247), as Realism expects. The dissimi-
larities to China’s approach in different regional theaters (cf. Ikenberry 
2011: 26–27, 82, 90–91, 283) and in an overarching comparison to Brazil 
corroborate the crucial impact of the international power distribution, 
the master variable of Realism. The norms and values highlighted by 
Constructivism, which should command more uniform behavior across 
the world, are much less important.7 
As this comparison suggests, the extension of Realism discussed in 
this essay elucidates not only the foreign policy of Brazil, but of other 
emerging powers as well (see also Layne 2012). The essay also demon-
strates the broader applicability of Realism, which can shed light on 
rising countries as well, and not only on traditional great powers. Be-
cause power pervades the international system (see Finnemore and 
Goldstein 2013), it shapes the opportunities and constraints facing these 
nations and substantially influences their foreign policy strategies. Last 
                                                 
7  “English School” thinkers such as Buzan (2004: 208–213) argue that norms 
and values come in regional clusters of different “thickness” (see also Hurrell 
2007: ch. 10). But international power constellations seem to underlie and drive 
this clustering, as the US’s especially intense efforts at promoting liberal values 
in Latin America suggest. 




not least, by applying this Realist line of reasoning to a prominent aspir-
ant and developing a coherent analysis of its foreign policies over more 
than a century, the present essay has sought to show the value of para-
digmatic thinking. Theory remains crucial for the field of International 
Relations. 
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Realismo sob Hegemonia: uma abordagem teórica acerca da as-
censão internacional do Brasil 
Resumo: Como o campo de Teoria das Relações Internacionais pode 
contribuir para o entendimento acerca de processos através dos quais 
países em desenvolvimento, como o Brasil, atingem uma posição de 
liderança regional e significativa influência internacional? A análise que se 
segue propõe que a perspectiva Realista explica a estratégia internacional 




da Politica Externa Brasileira durante as últimas décadas de maneira mais 
clara e convincente quando comparada às abordagens Liberal-institucio-
nalista e Construtivista. A despeito das mudanças de governo e regimes 
políticos, a PEB vem se caracterizando pela busca persistente de vanta-
gens políticas relativas, especialmente no que tange à ascendência inter-
nacional do país. Entretanto, a presença de um poder hegemônico no 
continente, os Estados Unidos, desafia a capacidade brasileira de utilizar 
os instrumentos e as táticas convencionais do Realismo (confronto poli-
tico-militar), motivando a preferência pela cooperação econômica nas 
suas relações tanto com tal poder hegemônico, quanto com os vizinhos 
mais frágeis. Portanto, é através da cooperação como estratégia de inser-
ção internacional que o Brasil busca obter vantagens comparativas, con-
tribuindo para o aumento de seu poder relativo. Por meio da elucidação 
destes cálculos complexos, o artigo apresenta como a abordagem Realista 
explica as possibilidades, limites e preferências de nações ambiciosas 
como o Brasil para perseguir os seus interesses em Politica Externa. Ao 
mesmo tempo, o artigo contribui para a elaboração de uma versão da 
teoria Realista que apreende as recentes dinâmicas de poder no sistema 
internacional. 
Palavras chave: Brasil, Politica Externa, Teoria de Relações Internacio-
nais 
 
